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Abstract:  Workplace  referrals  may  resolve  incentive  problems  that  arise  due  to  incomplete 
contracts.  We  use  an  in-depth  primary  data  set  covering  low-  and  unskilled  migrants  from 
Western Uttar Pradesh (India), to examine this and alternative explanations for referral-based 
recruitment.  We find little evidence of referral screening for unobservable worker traits, but 
some support for a hypothesis of referral as a mechanism to enforce workforce discipline. Two 
observations back this conjecture: the high prevalence of strong kinship ties between referees and 
new recruits and that those who recruit are in more ‘prestigious’ jobs and therefore have higher 
stakes vis-à-vis their employer. These main findings are exposed to robustness checks to rule out 
rival explanations: that entry through a workplace insider merely reflects privileged access to job 
vacancy information; that workplace clustering results from preferences for working together or 
that the higher prevalence of referral for very young migrants that we observe may reflect that 
referral has an insurance dimension.  
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1. Introduction 
In developing economies poor workers often rely on their social networks to acquire low 
and unskilled jobs. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) report that 70 % of blue collar jobs in 
Mumbai were found through referral
2 (with a corresponding figure for white collar jobs 
of  around  44  %)  and  with  a  higher  referral  prevalence  for  men  than  women.
3  In 
Nakanishi’s (1991) research of a Manila slum, contacts and referrals were  prerequisites 
for finding a job.  
Although the prevalence of network based labour market entry is well documented, 
less is known about why social networks are so important in this segment of the labor 
market.  This  is  unfortunate,  since  we  cannot  understand  how  social  networks  affect 
various labor market outcomes (wages, access to jobs etc.), or predict the impact of labor 
market regulations, without a firm grasp of the underlying network mechanisms and the 
benefits that these bestow on workers or employers (e.g. Iversen et al 2009: Iversen and 
Torsvik 2010). 
In this paper, we focus on one network mechanism, namely employee or workplace 
referral.  A straightforward explanation for the use of workplace referrals is information:  
Family  and  friends  may  have  privileged  information  about  job  openings  at  their 
workplace.  Alternatively, job seekers may use social connections to find jobs because 
they prefer, for economic or social reasons, to work close to family or friends. Another 
interesting  possibility  is  that  workplace  referrals  alleviate  incentive  problems  in 
recruitment.  If individuals know more about the productive skills of their family and 
friends, which is a reasonable assertion, an employer may take advantage of this and ask 
an existing employee to find a suitable recruit in his (or her) social network.  Although 
less discussed in the literature, workplace referrals may also alleviate behavioral (moral 
hazard) problems at the workplace.  Finally, employing someone from the social network 
of current workers may be a way for the employer to commit not to exploit the newcomer 
or for the newcomer to commit to not exploit the employer (that is, workplace referrals 
may solve hold up problems on both sides of a work relation).  
                                                 
2 Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2006) definition of referral is vague and captures whether an individual learnt about their 
first job through a social contact or not.  
3 McEntarfer (2003) makes a similar observation for blue collar jobs in her general and comprehensive literature 
review.     3
In order to evaluate the empirical merit of these different explanations for the use of 
employee referrals, we need in-depth information about the individuals used as referees 
and the recruits who are hired.  We have collected such information on low and unskilled 
migrants  from  a  poor  area  of  rural North-India.  Our  data  show  that  workplace  entry 
through  a  person  working  for  the  same  employer  is  widespread.  Contrary  to  recent 
suggestions (e.g. Karlan et al 2009), such entry typically occurs through a strong social 
tie. Another important pattern we observe is that while entry is into bottom tier jobs, the 
workplace intermediaries are usually persons in more prestigious jobs. Successful entry, 
therefore, may not only require a strong social tie to a workplace insider but also that 
such  insiders  enjoy  some  stature  within  the  recruiting  firm.  We  argue  that  these 
observations fit the notion that workplace referrals are used by employers to improve 
worker discipline (reduce moral hazard).   
To further ascertain the strength of this explanation we expose our main findings to 
robustness checks anchored in the most plausible rival explanations. Foremost among 
these is the idea that entry through a workplace insider merely reflects that the insider has 
privileged access to job vacancy information. We also test the hypothesis that the social 
clustering  we  observe  could  reflect  a  preference  for  working  together  that  may  be 
stronger in some villages or among some social groups than others. Finally, we explore 
the  hypothesis  that  referral  may  act  as  an  insurance  mechanism  for  very  young  job 
seekers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our study area. 
Following the description of our data set in section 3, the literature is reviewed and a  
simple  theoretical  framework  laid  out  in  section  4.  Section  5  presents  descriptive 
statistics on migration flows and on the attributes of the migrants featuring in our data-
set. Section 6 first presents statistics on network-based and other modes of labour market 
entry before shifting the focus to descriptive statistics highlighting the features and nature 
of the social and other connections that facilitate entry into first migrant jobs. In order to 
gain  insights  about  referee  stakes  vis-à-vis  their  employer,  this  also  includes  a 
comparison of  the traits  of  those  who  recruit  and  those  recruited.  Section  7  presents 
regression results and the robustness tests while section 8 concludes.     
   4
2. The study area  
Our data set is from two study villages in Nagina tehsil in Bijnor district in western Uttar 
Pradesh, India’s most populous state. A consistent underperformer, UP is part of India’s 
poverty belt and has the highest prevalence of stunting (47 %) among children below the 
age  of  three  of  any  Indian  state.  UP  is  also  shared  16
th  (among  20  states)  on  the 
percentage of underweight children in the same age group (46 %) (Shiva Kumar 2007).  
The  quality  shortfall  in  government  schools  (e.g.  Dreze  and  Gazdar  1998)  has 
prompted  a  proliferation  of  private  school  initiatives  starting  from  the  primary  level. 
According to the 2011 Annual Status of Education Report
4, Bijnor is 37
th on private 
school enrolment among the 70 districts in Uttar Pradesh with 39% of 6-14 year olds 
presently  enrolled  in  such  schools.  For  learning  outcomes  among  standard  1  and  2 
children, the district ranks 22nd on reading and 15
th on math skills. The 2001 Census 
rates for above age 7 rural literacy are 69.3 % for males and 43.3 % for females.
5 
Sugarcane, wheat and paddy remain the most important local crops in rural Bijnor 
and  for  low  and  unskilled  workers,  agricultural  labour  demand  exhibits  seasonal 
fluctuations that have compelled rural households to address lean season employment 
opportunity shortfalls. As elsewhere in rural India
6, migration for agricultural or allied 
work  has  been  common,  and  often  to  ‘nearby’  locations  for  sugarcane  processing 
(crushing) work.
7    
Unlike the adjacent district headquarters of Muzaffarnagar and  Moradabad, the 
latter a centre for North-India’s brass industry, Bijnor’s industrial base and local non-
farm employment opportunities have been slow to evolve. Coupled with a post 1991 
decline  in  the  availability  of  government  jobs    (Jeffrey  et al  2007),  frustrations  over 
limited local job opportunities run deep also among those who responded to the new 
educational opportunities in the post-reform era. This failure of education to fulfil the 
                                                 
4 Published by Pratham and based on the testing of learning outcomes of more than 500,000 school-age children. See 
http://www.asercentre.org/.  
5 The 2001 census figures for literacy among males and females above the age of 7 in our two study villages were 73.4 
% and 48.3 % in Kasba Kotra and 52.3 % and 19.6 % in Jagannathpur, respectively.  
6 e.g. de Haan and Rogaly (2002); Rogaly et al (2003). 
7 Our qualitative observations confirm these impressions. At the time of migration, most respondents list irregular 
construction and agricultural work as the main local alternative to their migrant job. Manual labour in brick kilns and 
seasonal weaving and tailoring are among the few local non-farm job opportunities.     5
expectations of educated young local men transcends caste and religious boundaries and 
has been a recurring theme in the rich sociological literature on Bijnor (ibid.).  
At 41 % Bijnor ranks third on the percentage of Muslims in the population in Uttar 
Pradesh.
8 The Muslim population comprises high status Sekhs as well as menial groups 
like washermen (Dhobis) and barbers (Salmanis). Conspicuous and the largest Muslim 
group in our study villages are the Ansaris (Julahas), traditionally a weaving community. 
Jats, the main local landowners and Chamars who are Scheduled Castes and traditional 
leatherworkers, are among the most conspicuous and numerous Hindu communities in 
the district.  
While the social and religious heterogeneity of the study area has been a seed of 
some conflict, the Ravidas Jayanti, a major and politically significant Chamar festival, 
was attended and celebrated by members of all communities in Kasba Kotra  in February 
2009.
9  In  the  latest  Gram  Panchayat  (village  council) election  in  the  same village,  a 
political alliance of Ansari Muslims and Chamars defeated and replaced an inefficient 
male (in a seat reserved for women) Jat incumbent with a new Chamar village council 
head.    
Our study of un- and low-skilled labour markets is thus located in an impoverished 
rural setting where the quality of public services often is absymal, where private school 
penetration  reflects  growing  parental  aspirations  and  with  an  interesting  social  and 
religious blend. Consistent with observations from other districts in Uttar Pradesh (Kapur 
et  al  2010),  there  is  also  discernible  occupational  change  among  the  Chamars  at  the 
bottom of the caste hierarchy.     
 
3. The data set 
Our data are from a random sample of households in Kasba Kotra and Jagannathpur 
villages in Nagina tehsil. The two villages were purposively selected and are located 
about 3 kms from Nagina town (30 kms to the east of Bijnor town) and the large village 
                                                 
8 From the 2001 Census. The two other districts in UP with more than 40 % Muslims are Moradabad (45.5%) and 
Rampur (49%). We are grateful to Roger Jeffery for sharing these numbers.  
9 Unlike in other studies conducted by the first author, some resistance to being interviewed was encountered in Kasba 
Kotra.    6
of Kotwali, respectively. Initial screening of neighbouring areas and villages suggest that 
the patterns reported below may be typical of rural Nagina as a whole.  
Having rejected as inadequate the Panchayat office house list in Kasba Kotra and 
the voter list in Jagannathpur, village censi were conducted and used to construct a proper 
sampling  frame  for  each  village.  From  each  village  and  following  a  PPS  principle, 
households  were  randomly  selected  for  interviews.  The  evidence  presented  below  is 
based on interviews with household members with a labour migration history who were 
identified during our initial household survey which covered 236 households in Kasba 
Kotra and Jagannathpur.
 10  
Among the 316 individuals with a labour migration history only two were women. 
Not surprisingly, a strong male bias therefore prevails in labour migration from our study 
area.
11 Through repeated village visits and the tracing of migrants in Chandigarh and 
Delhi, in distant Mumbai and Pune as well as in nearby Haridwar and surrounding areas 
with known factory clusters, we were able to pin down 278 or 88 % of these migrants. 
The first of this first round of migrant interviews were conducted in May 2009, the last in 
February 2010. Through subsequent tracing we have been able to increase the number of 
migrants interviewed to 287 (90.8 % of the sample).      
In our retrospective migrant sample the timing of the first labour migration stretches 
from  1950  and  upto  2009.  The  bulk  of  these  first  migrations  are  recent  with  64% 
occurring after 1990 and 39.3 % after 2000. We interviewed each migrant in depth to 
collect  as  complete  accounts  of  individual  employment  and  educational  histories  as 
possible. Particular emphasis was placed on accurate recording of the process of entering 
the first migrant job and on a selection of subsequent job changes.
12  
To convey an impression of the information at our disposal, we asked whether the 
first migrant job was pre-arranged and if so whether the migrant had received a job offer. 
If he did, we asked if the person who made the offer was working for the migrant’s first 
                                                 
10 An individual is understood to have a labour migration history if he has spent a minimum of one month continuously 
living away from the village for employment purposes. Following Winters et al (2001), we define a household as (i) 
people living under the same roof and who eat from the same kitchen and (ii) offspring or other family members who 
would otherwise reside with the unit in (i) but who have migrated for work.      
11 A first guess could be that this merely reflects the strict practice of female seclusion among Muslim (purdah) and 
Hindus (gungat) in the study area.  
12 Given the spread in timings of first migrant jobs, recall poses a methodological hazard. Testing recall in relation to 
migration, Smith and Thomas (2003) find that subjects are able to recall salient moves with greater accuracy: the first 
migrations we study are typically salient.   7
destination employer. If yes, we defined these as cases of workplace-referral, of which 
employee referral forms a subset.
13 For the person making the job offer on behalf of an 
employer, information was collected from the migrant on the relationship to the migrant 
and on the referee’s job (job title) within the recruiting firm. As explained in the theory 
section,  the  latter  intended  to  capture  the  referee’s  stake  vis-à-vis  the  employer  (e.g. 
Fafchamps  and  Moradi  2011;  Iversen  and  Torsvik  2010).  Similar  information  was 
collected for what we describe as main contacts below.  
Apart from education, information on work experience and skills were collected 
along  with  proxies  for  individual  unobservables  expected  to  be  important  in  an 
employment relation. These variables included a short Raven-type ability test, whether 
others perceived  the  migrant  to  possess  social  skills, practical  skills  (‘handyman’)  or 
whether others considered the migrant to be a person with ‘jugar’.
14 We also asked about 
individual aspirations, general knowledge and whether the migrant cast a vote in the most 
recent election.   
In addition, we collected information on the terms and duration (work-spells) of 
employment.  For  the  first  and  most  recent  migrant  job  we  also  asked  about  the 
acquisition and upgrading of skills in this job, on own ‘effort’ and on whether termination 
of an employment relationship was voluntary or not. We also asked whether the migrant 
experienced the first and most recent employer to be honest and if not, to give examples 
of employer dishonesty.              
 
 
4. Literature and theoretical backdrop  
In a study of migration by African Americans from Southern to Northern US in the early 
20
th Century, Carrington et al (1996) portray destination networks as devices that channel 
relevant information from pioneer to potential migrants, (see also Winters et al 2001). 
There are numerous accounts of how social networks spread information about vacant 
jobs and destination attributes. We want to examine if social networks provide benefits 
beyond information sharing, and to what extent these benefits explain the nature and 
                                                 
13 Our motivation for distinguishing workplace from employee referral is explained below. 
14 Which translates as ‘capacity to improvise shrewdly with available resources (Jeffrey et al 2007).’   8
prevalence of network-based recruitment. We are especially interested in the hypothesis 
that employment via networks can mitigate incentive problems in work relations.   
Munshi  (2003),  studying  migration  from  Mexico  to  the  US,  suggests  that  by 
providing referrals on behalf of new arrivals, veteran migrants aid destination employers 
by remedying asymmetric information problems that are acute when recruiting migrants. 
Munshi is, however, vague about the kind of advantage referrals bestow on destination 
employers and about the referral  mechanism itself.
15  Montgomery  (1991) considers  a 
specific referral mechanism; intermediation by an existing employee. In his model the 
employer advantage stems from assuming assortative matching in the networks of high 
quality  employees.  Hence,  hiring  new  staff  from  the  networks  of  high  productivity 
employees remedies adverse selection in recruitment. In Simon and Warner (1992), the 
referral mechanism is similar but it is not given that more productive employees have 
higher quality connections. Their key assumptions are that (i) individuals have privileged 
information  about  the  productivity  of  members  of  their  social  network  and  (ii)  that 
existing employees will only refer high productivity workers to their employer.   
In Kugler (2003), workplace referrals are instead used to monitor the behavior of 
newcomers once they are inside the firm.  By assumption, an employee referee monitors 
and applies peer pressure on the newcomer if he or she exerts less effort than the referee.  
Relying on the networks of employees with a high work morale to fill vacancies makes it 
less  costly  for  the  employer  (in  terms  of  the  necessary  wage  premium)  to  induce 
newcomers to exert high effort.
16   
One issue ignored in the papers above, is the motivation, or lack of motivation, 
referees have to reveal information about the productivity of job candidates or to monitor 
and  put  pressure  on  the  behavior  of  new  recruits  once  they  are  hired.  The  literature 
implicitly assumes that referee and employer interests are perfectly aligned.
 17 Fafchamps 
and Moradi (2011) present a case where this assumption does not hold.  Using data from 
the  Ghanaian  army,  they  found  no  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  referred 
workers are of a higher quality (lower quit and dismissal rates). They also find evidence 
of referee opportunism since soldiers referred by personnel close to retirement were of 
                                                 
15 Munshi does not, for example, distinguish employee referral from other types of referral.  
16 See Dhillon and Iversen (2011) for a theoretical analysis of social incentives, referral and efficiency wages.   
17 Dhillon and Iversen (2011) also address this issue more fully.   9
especially low quality. The authors suggest that the fact that close to retirement referees 
had  little  to  lose  by  recommending  low  quality  soldiers  (the  stakes  are  higher  for 
someone with a longer career horizon) may explain this pattern. 
Although the incentive problem facing referees appear to have been overlooked 
by a large public employer like the Ghanaian army, one would expect small enterprises to 
be  aware  of  potential  moral  hazard  problems  and  to  make  arrangements  that  give 
recommenders incentives to screen and monitor new recruits.  This idea is explored by 
Karlan et al (2009) who argue that in jobs where skills are important, but unobservable, 
strong  social  ties  between  employers  and  referees  are  necessary  to  sustain  trust  in 
recommendations.    
To gauge this argument, suppose worker quality is unobservable in the market place 
and  only  discernible  to  members  of  the  same  social  network  as  the  worker.    For 
simplicity consider two types of workers where high and low quality workers produce 
output  OH      and  OL,  respectively,  and  where  OH  >  OL.    The  going  wage  rate  in  the 
marketplace is w and it is common knowledge that a fraction p of the workforce is highly 
productive.  The expected gross surplus from hiring a worker in the market is R = pOH  + 
(1-p) OL.  If the employer is confident that the middleman will recommend a high quality 
worker, recruiting through the  middleman, rather than the market, would  generate an 
expected  surplus  R
*  =  OH  –  R.    Karlan  et  al.  assume  that  the  worker  (employee 
middleman) and the employer share this surplus. A high quality employee receives the 
market  wage  plus  a  share  aR
*of  the  surplus,  where  0  <  a <  1  reflects  the  worker’s 
bargaining power.    
A  low  quality  worker  has  an  incentive  to  bribe  the  mediator  to  underwrite  a 
recommendation.  The maximum bribe a low quality worker is willing to pay is aR
* and 
in order to induce truth telling, the recommender must lose something of at least similar 
value if he recommends a low quality worker.  In Karlan et al (2009), it is the value of the 
recommender’s social relationship to the employer that is at stake.  Denote this value T.   
It is clear that the employer can trust the person recommending a worker if and only if T
 
> aR
*.  Furthermore, an employer is especially concerned about selecting the right type 
of  worker  for  jobs  where  productivity  varies  with  skills  (and  where  the  difference 
between  OH  and  OL  is  large).    It  is  also  for  such  jobs  that  recommenders  have  the   10
strongest  incentives  to  accept  bribes  from  low  productivity  workers.    Hence,  a  key 
prediction  from  this  model  is  that  we  should  observe  stronger  social  ties  between 
recommender and employer when workers are hired for skilled as opposed to unskilled 
jobs. In fact, as Karlan et al point out, for jobs with no skill requirements job entries 
through weak social ties are expected.  An immediate implication for the low or unskilled 
jobs we study is that migrants should use their weak tie connections to find jobs.   
We extend this model in two directions.  First, even in jobs where skills are not an 
issue, workers can harm employers by not showing up at work or by not performing well 
while there. Put differently, and as documented in Banerji et al’s (2011) large study of 
hiring by Indian firms, moral hazard is an important issue also in the kind of low- and 
unskilled  jobs  covered  by  our  data.    Second,  it  is  not  only  social  collateral  that  can 
provide  a recommender with  an  incentive  to  act  in  the  interest  of  the  employer.  For 
example, when using the network of an employee to fill a vacancy (workplace referrals) 
the employer can punish the referee even if there is no social collateral at stake.  The 
employer can simply strip the recommender of workplace status and privileges (position, 
wage)  if  he  fails  to  ensure  that  the  newcomer  is  executing  his  work  duties.    This 
mechanism works best if the recommender and the new recruit are strongly connected. 
Our extension predicts that a person selected to act as a referee will have privileges in the 
current workplace and will also be strongly tied to the workers he recommends.   
To see this, consider a simple example where the worker who is hired earns a rent 
R* if he shirks at the job (if he uses his time and energy on private projects rather than 
performing the tasks he is set to do).  The worker will “perform” if and only if shirking 
inflicts an expected punishment that matches this rent. Suppose there is a probability q 
that the employer detects shirking and in this case inflicts a cost e on the shirker as well 
as a cost T on the workplace referee.  The referee will also monitor and impose a cost C 
on the newcomer he recommended if he observes shirking (we assume that the referee 
detects shirking with certainty).  Let s be an index variable that increases in the strength 
of the social tie between the referee and the new recruit.  The expected cost of shirking 
(for the worker) is now q(e + r(s)T) + C(s), where r(s) is the weight the entrant puts on 
the punishment imposed on the workplace referee in case shirking is observed.  Since it is 
reasonable to assume that both r(s) and C(s) are increasing in s, we have the following   11
three hypotheses. If network recruitment is used to curb moral hazard problems at the 
workplace we expect to observe. 
H1: An extensive use of workplace referrals.  The reason is that in order to discipline the 
newcomer the referee must be able to observe his workplace behaviour.  
H2: Employers use high rank or status employees as referees.  The rationale is that a 
worker with a higher rank or status has more to lose (a high T) from referring a worker 
who misbehaves or underperforms.   
H3: Strong social ties between the referee and the worker he recommends.  Strong ties to 
the recruit   makes it easier for the recommender to punish, and prevent, shirking   (a high 
s increases r  and C).   
  
 
5. Descriptive statistics: general 
Table 1 presents broad descriptive statistics disaggregated by social group for the first 
migrant  job  and  destination.  Ansaris  and  Chamars  are  both  strongly  represented  and 
simple comparisons highlight some startling contrasts – Ansaris were younger and less 
educated at the time of departure while their sectoral concentration is much stronger. 
Although Delhi is the main first destination for all three groups, the main first destination 
state was nearby Uttarakhand for Chamars and ‘Others’ and Maharasthtra, specifically 
Mumbai and Pune, for Ansari migrants. Notice also that the share of Ansaris migrants 
moving to large cities is higher than for the other groups. Ansari migrants are also spread 
across more destinations with first migrations primarily for bakery work to destinations 
stretching from Orissa and West-Bengal in the east, via Bihar and now Jharkhand and 
Punjab, to Gujarat in the west. In contrast, Chamar migrants typically cluster in nearby 
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Table 1:   Migration patterns for main social groups  
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Figure 1 presents the timing of the first labour migration for the 287 migrants in our 
sample, first for the full sample and then for Ansaris and Chamars. 
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Figure 1a) Full sample                                      
  
1 b) Ansaris            1 c) Chamars 
 
 
First migrations are spread out in time, with the main bulk occurring during the last 
decade. While early migration was comparatively higher among Ansaris, there appears to 
have been a particularly sharp recent rise in migration among Chamars. Compared to 
other studies (e.g. the review in Lucas 1993), the age at first migration from our study 
area is low. Figure 2 shows the high proportion of migrants in the 15-20 age range and 
the significant numbers also below that. In fact, 31.6 % of the 287 migrants were 14 years 
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Figure 2: Age at first migration 
 
Very  young  migrants  are  concentrated  in  the  Ansari-dominated  bakery  sector  with 
bakeries absorbing about two-thirds of the youngest migrants. Notice also that the mean 
age of first migrants dropped from 18.85 before to 17.11 years after 1991.
18 During the 
same period, the mean age of first migrants entering bakery sector work fell from about 
17 to 15 years.           
 
6. Descriptive statistics: network mechanisms in the labour market   
We next classify the mode through which these migrants entered their first migrant job 
and distinguish, firstly, between migrants with and without a pre-arranged job. The latter 
left for destination without a job waiting, whereas the former had a job lined up. For these 
two broad categories, we separate workplace referrals where a person intermediates and 
makes a job offer on behalf of his employer from what we call indirect network-based 
entry where a main contact, usually the person making a job offer, does not work for the 
migrant’s first destination employer.
 19   
Our  simple  taxonomy  of  destination  labour  market  entry  also  includes 
intermediation  by  labour  contractors.  Labour  contractors  in  Bijnor  have  traditionally 
                                                 
18 Statistically significant at the 5 % level.  
19 This person. when operating on behalf of the employer, may be an employee or the owner of the firm himself. For all 
referees and main contacts, we have collected information on relation to the migrant and job title. Notice that apart 
from the ‘indirect’ category there are also a few instances where a migrant relies extensively on the assistance of a main 
contact (e.g. a more experienced migrant) for finding short term jobs in a destination labour ‘chowk’ (spot market) or 
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recruited for agricultural and allied work, often on behalf of sugarcane crushing units 
located within or just outside the district boundaries.
20 
Formal labour market entry is a separate mode which includes being offered a job 
after responding to job advertisements for private sector and government employment, 
being selected for placement through a campus recruitment campaign or through similar 
channels.  The  two  remaining  and  comparatively  minor  categories  are,  first,  ‘asking 
around’ which is the closest we get to a destination job search process and secondly and 
observed in several destinations, directly approaching a local spot market for unskilled or 
skilled labour where those looking to hire on daily or short term basis are matched with 
job seekers.
21  Haridwar  in Uttarakhand  is  one  nearby destination  with  a  local  labour 
‘chowk’ that Bijnori migrants are familiar with while Delhi, the nearest big city, has 
many such spot markets. As expected, a substantial majority of the first migrant jobs 
were allocated informally.  
 
















Indirect  53  18.5 % 







     
Not pre-arranged  32  11.2 % 
 
Informal:  
   
Workplace referral   9  3.1 % 
Indirect  5  1.7 % 
By asking around  8  2.8 % 
By  directly  approach-
ing known spot market 
10  3.5 % 
 
                                                 
20 The recent proliferation of recruitment agencies in Delhi and other cities and that specifically target low and 
unskilled migrants by offering placements as domestic workers, security guards and so forth have had no discernible 
impact on first migrant jobs in our sample of migrants from Bijnor.  
21 See Bryan, Chowdhury and Mubarak (2011) for an innovative experiment illustrating why, in a context of 
widespread poverty, job search in the city (or at destination) may be prohibitively costly for most households thus 
helping to explain why, in such settings, jobs would be expected to be arranged up front and prior to migration.     16
The prevalence of pre-arranged employment for migrants in our sample, 88.8 %, is 
significantly higher than Banerjee’s (1991) estimate for a random sample of migrants in 
Delhi (58.6%). Combining pre- and non-pre arranged jobs, workplace referral is observed 
for 61.3 % of first migrant jobs. While lower than Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2006) 
estimate of ‘referral’ in male blue collar jobs in Mumbai, our definition of workplace 
referral is more precise and narrow than the one used by Munshi and Rosenzweig. In 
Banerjee  (1983),  which  contains  clues  about  the  incidence  of  workplace  referral,  the 
percentage  was  36  %  and  well  below  ours.  Once  indirect  entry  through  a  contact  is 
added, the incidence of network based labour market entry jumps to 81.5 %, which is a 
very high number.   
The  fact that  workplace  referrals  are so  prevalent  indicates  that  recruitment via 
social networks may be used to curb moral hazard problems at the workplace (confer our 
hypothesis H1 above).  The conjecture that recruitment via social networks  mitigates 
moral hazard problems at the workplace had two additional implications. If workplace 
referrals are used we expect strong social ties between the referee and the recruit and the 
recommender ought to have a “prominent” position in the workplace. We first consider 




Table 3: Social ties and workplace referral 
Relation to referee  N  Percentage   Cumulative 
Member of the same household  52  29.55 %  29.55 % 
Other relative  87  49.43 %  78.98 % 
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It is evident that kin account for almost 80 % of the cases of workplace referral with 
a member of the same household being the intermediary in about 30 % of the workplace 
referral cases. Village friends and acquaintances add up to just above 15 %. The most 
important relations for  mediating labour  market entry through workplace referral  are, 
however, relatives who do not belong to the migrant’s household. If relative is interpreted 
too  liberally  this  might  blur  the  distinction  between  strong  and  weak  ties.
22  Our 
descriptives  thus  indicate  that  strong,  kinship-based  ties  are  overwhelmingly  more 
important than weak ties for referral-based entry into first migrant jobs.  
We have also argued that employees with sufficient stakes should be more likely to 
be invited to act as referees by their employers. As a precursor to making comparisons of 
the jobs of referees and new recruits, table 4 illustrates the diversity of jobs held by 
referees, main contacts and new migrants in our data-set.  
   
                                                 
22 The largest categories of ‘other relative’ in table 3 are cousins (32), uncles (30) and brother-in-laws (17). While the 
term ‘uncle’ is used generously in the Indian context we have very carefully distinguished genuine from fictive kin.       18
 
Table 4:  Hierarchically ordered job titles for workplace referees, main contacts and 
new recruits 
  Rank  Type of jobs 
1  Enterprise owner   
2  Other prestigious 
jobs/positions 
Politician, University student, medical doctor, asst supervisor, 
supervisor, accountant (bakery), accountant clerk, sales clerk, sales 
manager (bakery), tailor master, forest department supervisor, block 
coordinator (UNICEF), district project coordinator (UNICEF), Assistant 
Agricultural Inspector, Territory manager (Pharmaceutical company), 
Toll clerk, Assistant general manager, School teacher (private school), 
Religious teacher (mosque), College teacher, Newspaper correspondent 
3  Skilled   Builder, electrician, carpenter, pottery maker, welder, tailor (machine 
operator), weaver (embroidery worker), mason (construction), mistry 
(bakery), cook (restaurant), barber, office peon, iron smith, motorbike 
mechanic, moulder, radio/tape/television repairer, engine mechanic 
(pumps, generators), iron moulder, powerloom mechanic, shopkeeper 
(petty), assistant storekeeper  
4  Other (less) 
skilled 
driver, domestic cook, rickshaw driver, furniture polisher, shop 
salesman, mattee (bakery product) maker, brush maker, beautician, 
sweets maker, house painter, nulki (bakery product) mistry, bhattee 
mistry (in charge of bakery oven), realer, battery mechanic, bicycle 
repairer, sewing machine operator (simple tasks), electric meter worker, 
scaler (forest department), waiter, housekeeper (hotel), farmer  
5  Vendor  bakery vendor, fruitseller, juiceseller, cobbler; snacks vendor, vegetable 
vendor, tent stall vendor, scrap vendor  
6  Apprentice 
/Trainee 
barber, tractor repairs, mason, welder, beautician, carpenter, electrician, 
machine operator, toy artist, tailor, battery mechanic, motor mechanic, 
iron smith, weaver 
7  Unskilled (upper)  shop assistant (sales counter helper), helper, packer, ‘soler’ (of shoes), 
counter of shoes (factory), table worker (bakery), cutter helper (factory), 
maintenance helper, ironing (dhobi), framechecker (factory), ‘roller’ 
(bakery), bhattee (oven) worker (bakery), gulli or nulki maker (bakery), 
jaggory maker, driver helper, bus conductor, chaprasi (messenger)   
8  Unskilled (lower: 
manual) 
sweeper, utensil cleaner, cleaner, rickshaw puller, machine cleaner 
(factory), unskilled factory worker, other domestic worker 
9  Unskilled (lower: 
manual) 
manual labour, agriculture, construction, white washing, tent worker, 






In Table 4, the jobs underlined are held exclusively by referees or main contacts 
while all other jobs, in principle, could be either a referee or first migrant job. Category 1   19
are enterprise owners and no attempt has been made to distinguish between ownership of 
small  and  larger  enterprises.  While  ownership  thus  includes  tiny  enterprises  such  as 
teashops, bakery owners are the biggest group of enterprise owners in our sample. The 
categories from 2 to 9 were attempted ranked according to skill requirements. Category 2 
covers  higher  prestige  jobs,  3  are  jobs  with  comparatively  high  skill  intensity  and 
category 4 somewhat less so.
23 Category 5 are vendors, often self-employed (but see 
below),  and  frequently,  because  of  the  nature  of  their  work,  people  with  useful 
connections, especially within the bakery sector. Category 6 covers apprentice jobs and a 
rich range of practical and technical skills in the process of being acquired. Category 7 
represents the upper end of the low-skilled jobs while categories 8 and 9 are physically 
demanding and unskilled, manual jobs. While any such ranking inevitably will contain 
arbitrary elements, table 5 is, we believe, a reasonable.  
Using these categories, figure 5 portrays job classifications for the first migrant jobs 
for the 287 migrants in our sample.   
 
Figure 5: Job classifications first migrant job  
 
 
                                                 
23 Prestige is not, of course, necessarily linked to skill: barbers, iron smiths and cobblers are all performing tasks with 
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78.7 % of the first migrant jobs are clustered from category 5 downwards with categories 
7 and 8 being the most common, followed by category 9 and then by apprentice jobs 
(category  6).  Put  differently,  first  migrant  jobs  are  typically  tough  and  physically 
demanding  and  the destination  work  lives  awaiting  the  migrants  from  our  two  study 
villages are, at least to start with, distinctly inglorious. We next make a comparison with 
the jobs held by the referees or contacts our migrants relied upon in order to enter these 
first migrant jobs. As figure 6 illustrates, the job profiles of these in-house referees or 
main contacts are strikingly different from those of the new recruits: 
 
Figure 6: Job classifications: in-house referees or main contacts 
 
 
Since we do not have information on the duration of the tenure of the referee in the 
workplace where a new recruit is brought in, we use the prestige attached to their job 
category as our proxy for their stake vis-à-vis their employer.
24  It transpires that links to 
people  who  either  are  enterprise  owners,  are  more  skilled  and  therefore  in  more 
prestigious jobs, or are vendors, who by virtue of their occupational specialisation have a  
                                                 
24 Remember that we interviewed migrants who typically would be knowledgeable about the job the referee held, but 
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broad  contact  base,  are  crucial  for  finding  the  first  migrant  job.  Further,  the  most 
important category turns out to be the enterprise owners themselves. Equally compelling, 
in about a third of the instances where the owner acted on behalf of the firm, he recruited 
a member of his own household. In 43 % of the same instances, the owner recruited 
another relative.
25 The descriptives suggest a close correspondence between our theory 
and the data which we return to in the empirical section below.    
 
7. Regression analysis      
The descriptive statistics square well with our suggestion that workplace referrals are 
used to restrain moral hazard problems at the workplace. But above we only considered 
migrants who entered their jobs with a workplace referral. Another way to test the moral 
hazard story is to compare workplace referrals with migrants who used other contacts to 
get their job.  The prediction is that those who enter via a workplace referral should have 
stronger  kinship  ties  to  their  referee  and  the  referees  themselves  should  have  more 
prestigious  jobs  than  those  in  the  reference  group  (those  entering  a  job  without  a 
workplace referral).   In our benchmark specification, we use a binary dependent variable 
that takes the value 1 if individual i entered his first workplace through workplace referral 
and 0 otherwise.
26 We relate this indicator to dummies capturing the social connections to 
the referee (or the main contact) and the status of the job hold by the referee (or main 
contact).   
  ) 1 ( 5 4 3 2 1 0 i NCOV NOR NHH JV JH i u D D D D D Y
i i i i i + + + + + + = b b b b b b   
On the right hand side, the two dummies with subscripts J pin down the jobs of in-
house referees or main contacts (whether the referees or contacts had jobs in category 1-4 
in table 1 for DJH or were (bakery) vendors for DJV). The following three dummies depict 
the social relationship between the new recruit and the in-house referee or main contact, 
specifically whether the workplace referee or main contact (i) was a member of the same 
                                                 
25 Notice that the combination vendor and workplacereferral is confined mainly to the bakery sector where vendors sell 
products on commission and without receiving a fixed salary but typically are linked to one bakery where the vendor 
shares accommodation with other bakery workers. The new migrant may then become an employee of the same bakery 
(most common) or a vendor assistant (less common) for the cases of workplacereferral or rely on the vendor’s links to 
other bakeries for indirect job entry.   
26 The 0 category (see also footnote 19 above) thus comprises migrants who entered employment ‘indirectly’, through a 
labour contractor or who otherwise relied on a main contact.    22
household (DNHH), (ii) was another relative (DNOR), or (iii) was a co-villager not related 
through kin.  
We estimate probit models for each specification and report the probit results as 
marginal probabilities. The benchmark results in table 7a confirm the impressions from 
section 6: strong kinship ties and contacts in prestigious jobs appear crucial for acquiring 
the first migrant job through workplace referral. 
 
Table 7a: “Benchmark model”:  Probit, workplace referral as dependent variable 
Variable   Marginal probability 
Referee has prestigious job  0.403*** 
(0.064) 
Referee is vendor                  -0.102 
(0.101) 
Referee is member of migrant’s household  0.341*** 
(0.069) 
Referee  is migrant’s relative   0.349*** 
(0.101) 
 







Note: In all specifications, standard errors are robust and clustered at the level of ‘tola’ or neighbourhood (there are a 
total of nine tolas in the two study villages). * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
We  have  touched  upon  rival  explanations  for  the  patterns  observed  in  our 
descriptive  statistics  –  specifically  the  hypothesis  that  workplace  insiders  may  have 
privileged access to vacancy information. Social clustering in the workplace could also 
reflect preferences for working together or a possible insurance effect reflected in the 
higher  prevalence  of  referral  among  younger  migrants.
27  We  cannot,  moreover  and 
without  further  scrutiny,  rule  out  that  strong  tie  and  prestigious  job  contacts  act  as 
screening devices.    
                                                 
27 The incidence of referral for migrants aged 12 and below is 85.3 %. For the 13-16 age group, the corresponding 
incidence is 70.9 % and for those aged 17 and above, the incidence is 49.3 %.   23
We first address the potential objection that our finding that workplace referral is so 
widespread could simply pick up that firm insiders have privileged access to information 
about vacancies in their workplaces and share this information with potential candidates. 
If correct, job acquisition would be expected to occur mainly through weak ties since 
weak  tie  search  would  be  the  most  efficient  job  search  strategy.  In  addition,  job 
acquisition would also be expected to typically occur through entry level workers since 
these (i) are likely to be more numerous than other staff and (ii) are the type of contacts 
our representative job seeker is most likely to know. While the high prevalence of strong 
tie entry in table 7a) militates against the weak tie search hypothesis, it is evident that co-
villagers  also  matter.  Yet,  what  further  undermines  the  insider  vacancy  information 
sharing hypothesis is that the connections that matter are not workers at the same level as 
the new entrants but individuals in more prestigious jobs. 
Using pathway analysis, we now adjust our benchmark specification to explore the 
merit of other competing explanations and as robustness tests.  Montgomery (1991) and 
Karlan et al (2009), among others, argue that employers use social networks to attain 
information about unobservable skills and talents of job candidates. One implication of 
such  unobservables  would  be  to  bias  our  estimates  since  the  coefficients  in  our 
benchmark model would be correlated with the error term. The two alternative and well 
known ways of addressing such endogeneity concerns is to resort to IV or proxy variable 
techniques (e.g.  Wooldridge  2002).  In  a  small  sample  like  ours  and  given  the  proxy 
variables at our disposal, we prefer the latter option.    
To examine the possibility that workplace referral is mainly used as a screening 
device (and to tackle endogeneity concerns) we expand our benchmark model by adding 
four  proxies  for  unobservable  individual  migrant  attributes  expected  to  matter  in  an 
employment relation to the benchmark specification: a general ability test score based on 
a Raven proxy plus variables that attempt to capture worker (i) social skills, (ii) practical 
skills and (iii) a measure of whether the worker is considered a person with ‘jugar’.
28 
These unobservables are captured by the coefficients aj and the vector X in equation (2). 
Since  close  kin  are  likely  to  possess  superior  information  about  exogenous  but 
                                                 
28 The last three are measured at the time of our survey so could potentially be outcomes of migration – reverse 
causality is thus a potential concern; however, the very limited impact on the other coefficients in the regression 
suggest that this is not a serious matter.   24
unobservable worker traits we cannot, a priori, rule out that referral through strong tie 
connections  benefit  employers  by  screening  for  such 
traits.
(2)           5 4 3 2 1 0 i i k i j NCOVi NOR NHH JV JH i v D X D D D D D Y
i i i i i + + + + + + + + = g a b b b b b b ￿
 
 
We also introduce controls for observable individual attributes, i.e. age at the time 
of migration and years of schooling. For the former we use a dummy which takes the 
value 1 for migrants aged 12 and below and 0 otherwise alongside a general variable for 
age at migration. These observables are also included in the coefficients aj and the vector 
X in equation (2).   
If the advantages to employers of recruitment (i) through strong tie networks or (ii) 
through  staff  in  more  prestigious  jobs  mainly  are  manifested  through  screening  for 
migrant unobservables, the strong tie and prestigious job coefficients should substantially 
weaken once these four unobservables are controlled for.  
 As  seen  in  column  1  in  table  7b,  however,  the  impact  of  controlling  for  these 
unobservable  as  well  as  the  observable  worker  traits  on  the  highjob  and  social  tie 
coefficients are negligible. It appears, therefore, that strong social ties and recruitment 
through  staff  in  more  prestigious  jobs  do  not  provide  employers  with  a  screening 
advantage.  
At  the  same  time,  workplace  referral  does  involve  some  screening,  given  the 
positive and significant coefficient for the jugar dummy. A person who in local parlance 
is  a  ‘jugari’  (see  footnote  15)  is  thus  more  likely  to  be  recruited  through  workplace 
referral.  
There is also a suggestion that referral, because of the strongly positive age 12 and 
below dummy and irrespective of whether it occurs through a strong tie or a person in a 
prestigious job may act as an insurance mechanism for very young migrants. 
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Table 7b: Testing rival explanations; Probit with workplace referral as dependent 
variable     
Variable  Model 
 
 
High jobs, strong 





Bakery sector  
‘fixed’ effect 







Referee is vendor         -0.156 
(0.106) 
 













Referee is migrant’s relative   0.322*** 
(0.093) 
 













‘Raven’-score         -0.003 
(0.027) 
 
          0.007 
(0.027) 
           -0.002 
(0.027) 
Dummy=1 if migrant is 








Dummy=1 if migrant is 
person with social talent  
        -0.026 
(0.083) 
 
         -0.026 
(0.077) 
             0.107 
(0.092) 
Dummy=1 if migrant is  
person with practical talent 
        -0.102 
(0.078) 
 
         -0.079 
(0.097) 
            -0.058 
(0.088) 
Age at migration          -0.012* 
(0.007) 
 
        -0.010 
(0.006) 
            -0.005 
(0.006) 
Age below 12 at migration 






   0.192*** 
 (0.039) 
Yrs of schooling           0.003 
(0.003) 




  (0.002) 
Ansari    0.169*** 
(0.056) 
 
            -0.005 
(0.055) 
Dummy=1 if village 
is Kasba Kotra 






(Dummy=1 if migrant job is 
in agriculture or construction) 
    -0.387** 
(0.180) 
 
Bakery (Dummy=1 if 
migrant job is in bakery) 





N                                                                                                  
         0.2562 
          260 
         0.2715 
           260 
0.3391 
               260 
Note: In all specifications, standard errors are robust and clustered at the level of ‘tola’ or neighbourhood (there are a 
total of nine tolas in the two study villages). * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.    26
 
 
Responding to Manski’s (2000) incisive insight that different social effects may 
give rise to similar patterns in data (even in a data-set as in-depth as ours) consider the 
preference-based  rival  explanation  for  workplace  clustering:  rather  than  acting  as  a 
screening or worker disciplining device, workplace clustering of family/relatives could 
simply reflect preferences for working together.  
We are able to test and control for such preferences at the level of the jati (sub-
caste and its equivalent for Muslim workers) and at the level of the village (e.g. Banerjee 
1983; Munshi 2003). Specifically, we add dummies for belonging to the most numerous 
group within our migrant sample, namely the Ansaris, along with a village dummy to 
control for village level variation in social cohesion and family relations with coefficients 
captured by  gk in equation (2). If the strong social tie coefficients simply  reflect that 
members of the largest social group have more intense preferences for working together, 
controlling for their identity should turn the strong tie coefficient insignificant. Similar 
reasoning applies to such preferences at the village level. The results from introducing 
these two controls are reported in column 2 in table 7b.  
Note that excepting the weak tie probability, other probabilities of interest now 
shrink  in  size.  The  coefficient  on  relatives  also  becomes  statistically  weaker.  Closer 
scrutiny reveals that these are mainly Ansari effects: the village dummy has no effect, 
whatsoever. Beyond the effects operating through the highjob and social tie coefficients, 
there appears to be a large and separate effect of Ansari identity on the probability of 
being recruited through referral.   
         In light of the descriptive statistics in section 6, which suggested a particularly high 
prevalence of referral within the bakery sector, it is quite possible that the strong social 
tie  and  high  job  coefficients  are  driven  by  unobservable  characteristics  of  the  small 
enterprises that dominate the bakery sector. Column 3 in table 7b) report the results of  
introducing, firstly, a bakery sector dummy and secondly a dummy for first migrant jobs 
in  agriculture  and  construction  sector  jobs.  The  latter  are  typically  short-term  and 
seasonal. These coefficients and sectoral dummies are also included in gk and the vector 
of dummy variables D in equation (2).      27
These two sectoral dummies are both statistically significant, the bakery dummy 
is positive and significant at the 1 % level. The coefficients of interest all shrink in size 
and become weaker but do, in all instances, remain statistically significant at least at the 5 
% level. Put differently, while the strong tie and high job effects observed are stronger in 
the bakery sector they also extend beyond this particular sector. This is consistent with 
the  descriptive  statistics  reported  in  section  6  and  lends  support  to our  moral  hazard 






In this paper we suggest and test the hypothesis that employers use social networks to 
find new workers because it restrains misbehavior at the work place.   If – indeed –   
curbing moral hazard problems is an important reason for the use of network recruitment 
we argue that one ought to observe the following: 
(i)  a high prevalence of work place referrals,  
(ii)  strong social ties between the referee and the recruit and 
(iii)   referees holding  relatively prestigious positions at the work place.   
We  contrast  these  predictions  with  an  in-depth  primary  data  set  covering  low-  and 
unskilled migrants from Western Uttar Pradesh (India).  Our data squares well with the 
moral hazard story.  Our case is not decisive; there are other concerns that may explain 
the  prevalence  of  workplace  referrals.    We  do,  however,  address  the  main  rival 
explanations  and although they may partly explain the prevalence of workplace referral, 
they do not alter our conclusion:  For migration into low- and unskilled jobs,  moral 
hazard is a relevant problem that employers use workplace referrals to overcome.    
                                                 
29 Conditional on workplacereferral, the percentage of first migrants recruited through co-villagers in bakeries is 18 %, 
while the corresponding figure for other sectors is 10 %.   
30 The fact that we are covering an extensive time period makes it pertinent to scrutinise possible time trends in referral 
incidence:  the  prevalence  of  referral  could  be  increasing,  for  instance  because  of  a  growing  number  of  social 
connections at the village level. Adding dummies for the time periods pre-1970, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 
2000 onwards make no difference to the reported results.   
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